Ireland (July 3, 1996)

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Score = 23

Governed by: Competition Act 1991 as last amended on 3 July 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “Competition Act”)[1]; Irish Mergers, Take-Overs, and Monopolies Control Act 1978 as last amended on 3 July 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “Merger Act”)[2]; and Irish Competition Amendment Act 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “Amendment Act”)[3]. [4]

Category Subcategory Score Comment
Scope Extraterritoriality 1 §4(1) of the Competition Act applies to arrangements which have an effect in the state.
Remedies Fines 1 §3(1) of the Amendment Act allows for fines for violations of the Competition Act.
Prison Sentences 1 §3 of the Competition Act permits imprisonment.
Divestitures 0
Private Enforcement 3rd Party Initiation 1 §6 of the Competition Act gives any person injured by one of the abuses or agreements prohibited the right to bring a suit by the High Court.
Remedies Available to 3rd Parties 1 §6 of the Competition Act gives any person injured by one of the abuses or agreements prohibited a right of action for damages.
3rd Party Rights in Proceedings 1 §9 of the Competition Act says that anybody aggrieved by a license or a certificate of the Authority may file an appeal.
Merger Notification Voluntary 0
Mandatory 3 §5(1) of the Merger Act requires pre-merger notification.
Pre-merger 2 §5(1) of the Merger Act requires pre-merger notification.
Post-merger 0
Merger Assessment Dominance 0
Restriction of Competition 1 §8(2)(a) of the Merger Act requires the Minister to consider whether the proposed merger was likely to prevent or restrict competition.
Public Interest (Pro D) 0
Public Interest (Pro Authority) 1 §8(2)(a) of the Merger Act requires the Minister to consider whether the proposed merger would “operate against the common good”.
Other 1 Other considerations listed in §8(2)(b) of the Merger Act include implications for employment, regional development, research and development.
Efficiency 1 §8(2)(b)(iv) of the Merger Act lists efficiency as a consideration in merger assessment.
Dominance Limits Access 1 §5(2)(b) of the Competition Act prohibits limiting production and markets.
Abusive Acts 1 §5(2) of the Competition Act lists abusive acts that are prohibited by dominant undertakings.
Price Setting 1 §5(2)(a) of the Competition Act prohibits price setting.
Discriminatory Pricing 1 §5(2)(c) of the Competition Act prohibits applying dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions.
Resale Price Maintenance 1 The Competition Authority has interpreted §4(1) of the Competition Act to prohibit RPM.[5]
Obstacles to Entry 0
Efficiency Defense 0
Restrictive Trade Practices Price Fixing 1 §4(1)(a) of the Competition Act prohibits price fixing.
Tying 1 §4(1)(e) of the Competition Act prohibits tying.
Market Division 0
Output Restraint 1 §4(1)(b) of the Competition Act prohibits limiting or controlling markets and production.
Market Sharing 1 §4(1)(c) of the Competition Act prohibits market sharing.
Eliminating Competitors 1 §4(2)(ii) of the Competition Act prohibits eliminating competitors (and exempts acts that have this effect from the efficiency defense).
Collusive Tendering/Bid-Rigging 0
Supply Refusal 1 The Competition Authority has acknowledged that supply refusal is often and illegal extension of selective distribution.[6]
Efficiency Defense 1 §4(2) of the Competition Act says that the Authority can allow agreements in violation of §4(1) if they contribute to improving production and distribution of goods and promote economic or technological progress.

References

  1. Competition Law in the EU, at 835-854.
  2. Id. at 855-868.
  3. Id. at 868-877.
  4. Citation to statute source.
  5. See Gill & Macmillan Terms and Conditions, Competition Authority Decision No. 365 of 28 October 1994.
  6. See Independent Newspaper Marketing Limited/Retailers, Decision No. 482, 15 April 1997. (“Where refusal to supply decisions are based on quantitative rather than qualitative factors it implies that the object and the effect is to limit the number of retailers in order to protect existing outlets and implies a tacit understanding or concerted practice between the supplier and those retailers.”)